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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The breaking of encrypted message traffic from the German Enigma cipher
machine, first achieved by the Polish cryptographers before the war, but
then on a huge scale at Bletchley Park during World War II by a team
led by Alan Turing, was of great strategic significance. Motivated by the
historic nature of the Enigma, and the fact that we had the possibility of
gaining access to an operational original machine, we decided it would be
interesting to investigate the possible effectiveness of a side-channel attack
on the machine that exploited the noise made by the act of typing the source
plaintext1. (The issue of the likely practicality, or rather impracticality, of
successfully eavesdropping on Enigmas in use during wartime did not concern
us.)
In recent years there has been much work on acoustic side-channel attacks
on various types of modern keyboard [1, 23, 4]. There is now a very extensive
literature on the cryptologic aspects and the historic impact of the Enigma,
but we are unaware of any previous account of an investigation into its
susceptibility to an acoustic side-channel attack.
The Enigma keyboard is at first sight rather similar to that of an old
mechanical typewriter, though typing on its keys requires much more force,
due to the amount of machinery involved. It differs greatly from a modern
keyboard, and is much more noisy, due to movements of one, or on occasion
two or more, of the internal rotors and associated machinery in response to
each key press. Nevertheless we felt it appropriate to try applying state-of-
the-art acoustic side channel attacks, as used against modern keyboards, to
investigate the possibility of identifying the individual Enigma keys from the
noises they made.
The main goal of our project was, therefore, to build a systematic means
of recognizing each keystroke of the Enigma machine, a task that involved
using machine learning algorithms. Our aims were:
• To extract a characteristic feature from the sounds of keystrokes, i.e.,
one which differed across the various keys but was the same in all
keystrokes performed using a given key.
• To find the most efficient and effective recognition method. By such
means, we believed it would be possible to obtain the clear text of
Enigma messages without having to perform any cryptanalysis, indeed
1The Enigma machine used in our research was borrowed for the experiments. All
sound recordings made in the experiments are publicly available at the address given at
the end of the paper. Our making these digital recordings and performing this acoustic
analysis is our modest contribution to reminding others of the history of, and also to
paying tribute to the code-breaking heroes at, Bletchley Park during World War II.
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without needing to find out anything about the current set-up of the
machine. (Discovering or determining the setting was a vital step in
Enigma decryption methods.)
The possibility of learning whether and how well current acoustic side-
channel attacks would work on a historic cipher machine was of course in-
triguing, even if of little practical utility, and allowed us to take advantage
of the fact that we were in the lucky position of having access to a working
original three-rotor WWII Enigma Machine. The Enigma was we hoped a
good choice to test our proposed methods. Firstly, unlike ordinary keyboards
which come from many different manufacturers, in various types and shapes,
the form and physical specifications of the Enigma machine's keyboard and
rotor machinery were, we understood, essentially the same in all the main
models, so the fact that we had only a single machine for our experiments
was acceptable. Secondly, the keyboard of the Enigma requires considerable
pressure to operate, so we felt there might be a smaller impact on our results
of individual typists' typing characteristics. (However, we involved different
types of people in our data collection scenario in order to try to validate this
belief.)
1.2 Organization
In this paper we document an investigation into the possibility of perform-
ing successful acoustic side channel attacks on an Enigma. This investiga-
tion aimed to apply the techniques previously applied to modern keyboard
sounds to Enigma sound samples. However, we found it necessary to develop
some new procedures to pre-process the sound samples and perform feature
extraction.
The organization of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, we provide some
background information about Enigma and acoustic side channel attacks.
Section 3 discusses Enigma keystroke sound samples, and the differences
between Enigma keystroke sounds and those of modern keyboards. Section
4 explains the data collection techniques we used. In Section 5 we cover
the analysis procedures we developed for preprocessing and recognizing the
samples. Section 6 summarises our experimental results. Finally, conclusions
are provided in Section 7.
2 Background
2.1 The Enigma Machine
The Enigma is a cipher machine that was used during World War II by
numerous German military and government organizations. The successful
breaking of many coded messages produced by this machine was one of the
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key Allied successes of World War II. Many military historians have in recent
years claimed that the breaking of Enigma shortened the war by at least two
years [13]. This code breaking was done by a team of cryptographers at
Bletchley Park, one of whose leaders was Alan Turing. However, the code-
breaking techniques that were developed at Bletchley Park are beyond the
scope of this paper - their details can be found in [14] and [17].
A top view of an Enigma machine is shown in Figure 1 (a) and its inner
mechanism in Figure 1 (b). Each of the rotors in an Enigma embodies a
mono alphabetic substitution cipher. (The machine shown is a three-rotor
Enigma, the most common type.) The sender and receiver of messages need
have exactly the same settings in their respective Enigma machines in order
that they can encode and decode messages successfully. An Enigma's setting
comprises (i) the choice of rotors (generally three out of a set of five), (ii) the
relative position in the Enigma of the chosen three rotors, (iii) the position
of the notch on each rotor, adjustable when the rotor is taken out of the
Enigma, which controls when it will cause the rotor to its left to be forced to
move (denoted by a number in the range 1 to 26), (iv) the individual starting
angular position of each rotor (again denoted by a number in the range 1 to
26, visible through a window in the rotor cover), and finally (v) the way in
which the front plug-board panel is plugged.
The rotors are shown to the top left of the keypad. For each keystroke,
the rightmost rotor moves by one angular position. Every 26 moves of the
first rotor, the second rotor also moves; and every 26 moves of the second
rotor the third rotor also moves.
The operators were provided with an instruction book giving the settings
to be used each day - some of the settings were changed more frequently than
others. Before each typing session the operator had to set up the Enigma
and its rotors as laid down in the instruction book. Then, as the plaintext
message was typed, light bulbs were illuminated in the lamp board showing
the encrypted character that corresponds to the typed character. These
encrypted characters were then transmitted by radio, using morse code, to
the distant operator to be entered into his Enigma so as to retrieve the
plaintext.
2.2 Acoustic Side Channel Attacks
Acoustic Side Channel attacks on keyboard emanations were first proposed
by Asonov et al. in [1]. In their research, normalized Fast Fourier Trans-
form (FFT) features of the press segment (down stroke) of the keystroke
sound were identified and classified using a simple back-propagation Neural
Network. They obtained promising results which showed that Acoustic Side
Channel attacks could be a serious threat. Providing one has physical ac-
cess, eavesdropping can be performed easily by using a simple microphone
and can reveal a lot of information about what is being typed. Needless
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(a) Enigma typing from different angles (b) Major components of an Enigma
Figure 1: Enigma Structure
to say, they also showed that their results depended on the typist and the
physical specifications of the keyboard.
Zhang et al. in [23] used the Mel-Frequency Cepstrum Coefficients (MFCC)
[8] of the press phase using a Linear Classifier which improved Asonov's re-
sults. We will explain more about the MFCC feature in Section5. They also
adapted a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [3] to correct the typo mistakes
and misclassified characters to boost the recognition rate.
Berger et al. in [4] considered the similarity metrics of the acoustic signals
(they used Cross-Correlation of the signals) and recognized words based on a
pre-defined dictionary. They considered the correlation between keystrokes
to determine the key presses.
There have also been examples of acoustic side channel attacks on other
computer peripherals. For example, Backes et al. in [2] tried to recognize
printed words based on the sounds ordinary printers produce during printing.
Tromer et al. in [21] managed to perform various timing attacks on a
CPU executing cryptographic operations. They did this by recording the
emanated human-audible sound of cooling fans and other ultrasound vibra-
tions of motherboard elements. In 2013, Genkin et al. even pushed the
boundaries further in [12]. They successfully extracted the RSA key from
the CPU emanated sonic vibrations. They recorded the sound by using
common mobile phone put aside the laptop running a RSA implementation.
In summary, as a result of recent improvements in signal processing and
machine learning techniques, acoustic emanations are becoming a dangerous
threat to digital systems with some mechanically moving items. Considering
the new type of attacks and new technologies integrated into mobile phones,
we have to expect more of such serious attacks in the near future.
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3 First Observations
Evidently, modern keyboards differ greatly from that of the Enigma, and
not just in appearance. The sounds produced by pressing modern keys and
Enigma keys are noticeably different, and indeed the Enigma keys are very
noisy. We needed to investigate two issues in order to establish the feasibility
of the project:
• How do the sounds of Enigma keystrokes differ from those of ordinary
modern keyboards?
• Do the sounds made by the twenty-six Enigma keys differ from each
other?
In the initial stage of the project we used a small set of recordings of an
Enigma that had been provided to us in order to address these questions.
3.1 Comparison with modern keyboards
In Figure 2 (a), the amplitude of an ordinary keystroke is shown (based on
[23]). The amplitude of an Enigma keystroke is shown in Figure 2 (b). A
significant difference between the amplitudes is evident. The amplitude of
an Enigma keystroke is greater than that from ordinary keyboards. This
difference between an ordinary keystroke and an Enigma keystroke is caused
by the different physical mechanisms of the devices. With Enigma, unlike
ordinary keyboards, a relatively-heavy metal rotor turns through one angular
position at each keystroke. Indeed on occasion two or even three rotors move
in response to a single keystroke. Moreover, typing on the Enigma keyboard
involves other mechanical movements, which leads to additional noises.
3.2 Comparing the different keystrokes in an Enigma
We tried to find whether there were visible dissimilarities between differ-
ent keystrokes and similarities among multiple recordings of the same key.
Figure 3 shows the amplitude of the sound recordings of six key strokes
(QWERTY). They are visually different, showing distinct characteristics
in the waveform shapes.
Following this, we checked whether there was any visual similarity be-
tween different strokes of the same key. In Figure 4, the amplitude of 4
strokes key E is illustrated. The black arrows show the areas that look
alike.
These visually-identified differences and similarities were the starting
point of our project. The recognition methods we used and implemented
are described in the following sections.
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(a) Sound sample of a modern keyboard keystroke [23]
(b) Sound sample of an Enigma keystroke
Figure 2: Sound Samples of Enigma in comparison to Modern Keyboard
4 Data Collection
We needed to record a number of real Enigma keystrokes from a reasonable
variety of users. We were allowed to use a genuine Enigma from a private
collection for a day. So we had to come up with a procedure to collect data
in a way that we believed would fulfil the goals of the project.
We first defined what we expected from the recordings that we planned
to make:
• First, the recordings had to be from different typists, differing with
regard to age, gender and skill.
• Second, the recordings had to contain the effects of some double rotor
movements. (We decided to ignore the much less frequent triple rotor
movements.)
• Third, the recording must cover different speeds of typing.
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Figure 3: Sound Samples of different Enigma keys
• Fourth, each recording had to involve a single participant, who typed
exactly the same sequence of letters on the Enigma machine.
• Fifth, all recordings should involve the same number of double rotor
movements.
• Sixth, we should have enough recording sessions to have an adequate
number of samples for each key.
Our plan for meeting these requirements was the following. Each partic-
ipant was asked to proceed as follows. The three rotors were to be set to the
same initial positions, denoted as (1, 1, 1), and the participant had to type a
sequence following the order in which they appeared on the keyboard - more
specifically, starting with Q in the left hand top corner, through to L in the
bottom right hand corner, and then repeating the letter L once more, hence
27 key strokes in total. Other than the rotor settings, which had to be re-
initialised to (1, 1, 1) after each set of 27 keystrokes, all other aspects of the
Enigma's setting were left unchanged for the duration of the experiments.
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Figure 4: Sound samples from pressing the same key 4 times (key E)
The procedure, as it was conveyed to each participant, is given in Fig-
ure 7. During recording, a supervisor was responsible for controlling the
recording, setting the rotor starting positions, and observing that the par-
ticipant followed the procedure correctly, finally checking that the Enigma
rotor positions had reaching the defined final setting.
The recordings were made in a conference room. We used an ordinary
hand-held microphone, and held the microphone roughly 20 centimetres from
the Enigma while recording. We used the open source Audio Editor and
Recorder Audacity [7] to control the recording. All recordings were set to
the sample rate of 44100, 32 bit per sample in mono mode. Given the
conditions the final recordings contain occasional background noises as well
as the keystroke noises.
We recorded 32 participants in total. Their ages ranged from the 20s
to the 70s. They were of different genders, body strengths, and typing skill
levels. Each participant typed the 27 letters five times in a row. We found
that, since the Enigma keyboard is hard to press, the participants were
usually quite tired after the third round or so, and from then on typed more
slowly, thus helping to fulfil our third requirement.
We asked the participants to type the final key L twice. This ensured
that there was one double rotor movement. In fact, the way in which the
Enigma was set up, before the first pressing of L, when the Enigma rotor
sequence had reached (1, 1, 26), only the rightmost rotor had moved. Then
the next keystroke, i.e., first depression of the letter L, caused both the
9
Figure 5: The Participants in the Data Collection Session
middle and the rightmost rotor to move, so leading to position (1, 2, 1). On
the second pressing of L only the rightmost rotor moved. Thus we captured
the basic sounds of all the different keys, and one instance of a key-press that
caused a double movement, from each typing sequence. This enabled us to
satisfy, at least minimally, the fifth expectation, and to assess the recognition
of double rotor movements as well as all the different keys when they caused
just a single movement.
Each participant filled in a debriefing form at the end of their recording
session. They were asked two questions. The questions were as follows:
1. How different was typing with Enigma comparing to the modern Key-
boards? (Answers: Totally, Not Much, Same)
2. Do you think that it is possible to identify the keys stroke just from
the sounds produced by typing? (Answers: Yes, No, Maybe)
Most of the participants found the Enigma typing experience totally
different compared to modern keyboards. Nearly 40% of the participants
rejected the possibility of performing Acoustic Side Channel Attack on the
Enigma.
The distribution of participants with regard to the ages, genders and
experience in typing are shown in figure 5. Participants' answers to the
debriefing questions are illustrated in figure 6.
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Figure 6: The Answers of the participants to debriefing questions
Figure 7: Data Collection Procedure
5 Data Analysis
We carried out experiments in two phases: training and recognition. An
overview of the procedure is shown in Figure 8. The data analysis consists
of four steps. We describe each step in the following sections.
5.1 Normalization
In this step, we imported the recorded samples for processing. After import-
ing, we normalized the samples. In early stages of our work, we processed the
unmodified samples but normalization affected the experimental results. We
have normalized the samples with squared 2-norm method. In this method,
first the signal norm is computed by normal Euclidean normalization rep-
resented in equation 1, in which n is the signal sample size and s(i) is the
signal value in the jth position.
N =
(
n∑
i=1
s2(i)
) 1
2
(1)
Then, the signal data is divided by the squared norm plus a bias con-
stant number b which in our case was 1e-10. The final normalized signal is
computed by equation 2.
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Figure 8: The Analysis Procedure for recognizing the keys
S(i) =
s(i)
N2 + b
(2)
5.2 Pre-Processing
Pre-processing is an important step in recognition. The aim of this step
was to find the most important parts of each sample. Asonov et al. [1] had
identified two important stages in the sound of each keystroke on a modern
keyboard. For our initial investigation, we were provided with samples of
Enigma sound recording. After examining these samples, we found there
was a distinct difference between key pressing and releasing. Furthermore,
there were some distinguishable features before the main press sound and the
release sound. The physical make-up of the Enigma plus its rotor movements
are the source of these extra peak sounds. Based on these observations, we
decided to take these peak sounds into consideration in addition to the main
press and release sounds. We term these extra peak sounds Pre-Press
and Pre-Release in this paper. The four peaks of a keystroke with their
corresponding names are illustrated in Figure 9.
We chose the Linear Prediction Coefficients (LPC) based algorithm to
identify these peaks. The LPC is a commonly used technique in speech
recognition to identify peaks in a speech signal [19].
This method was originally suggested by Gunnar Fant [10] for linearly
estimating the speech production. In this approach, the speech signal is
calculated as equation 3 in which the speech sample is modelled as a weighted
sum of p previous samples plus some excitation parameter.
y[n] = x[n] +
p∑
k=1
aky[n− k] (3)
In the linear model, x[n] is often considered as error (or residual) and
written as e[n], as in equation 4. The optimum Prediction Coefficient ai
minimizes the error (residual) rate [9].
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Figure 9: The Peaks recognized in each sample using the LPC error proce-
dure
e[n] = y[n]−
p∑
k=1
aky[n− k] (4)
where y[n] is the estimated predicted signal based on x[n]. Therefore,
the LPC indicates an estimate of the excitation signal in the current sound.
Parameters ai are the ones that minimize the energy in the signal. In other
words the sum of e[n] for all samples in a frame is considered as the total
LP error of the frame. The frame with the maximum error rate indicates a
potential peak.
Using the average energy of each frame is another common approach
to finding the press and release peaks in acoustic side channel attacks on
modern keyboards. In Figure 9, the analysis of an Enigma keystroke is shown
in Energy-based and LPC-based approaches. Comparing the two methods,
we found LPC more consistent and accurate in recognizing the main parts
of the keystroke.
In the pre-processing step, we prepared the samples as follows:
1. The samples were framed using rectangular windows. The length of
each window was 10 ms and there are no overlaps between windows.
2. We calculated the LPC error for each frame in our sample. We did
this for all the frames in each sample.
3. We defined a threshold that we used to identify the significant frames,
i.e. the frames in which the keystroke happened.
4. We found the top two significant frames from the largest LPC error.
The first such frame is the Peak and the second is the Release Peak.
5. The frame with the biggest LPC error which happened before the Press
Peak is the Pre-Press Peak.
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6. The frame with the biggest LPC error which happened in between
Press and Release Peak is the Pre-Release Peak.
5.3 Feature Extraction
Asonov et al. [1] used FFT coefficients as the feature to implement their
acoustic side channel attack on modern keyboards. Zhaung et al. [23] com-
pared different feature choices and determined that MFCC (Mel-frequency
cepstral coefficients) [8, 11, 16] provided the best recognition results.
The word cepstral needs more clarification in this context. A cepstrum
is the result of taking the inverse fourier transform (IFT) of the logarithm
of the estimated spectrum of a signal. (The word cepstrum is the result
of reversing the first four letters of the word spectrum.) Investigating the
cepstra is called cepstral analysis.
5.3.1 MFCC Feature
MFCC in speech recognition is the representation of the short-term power
spectrum of the sound. Linear cosine transform of a log power spectrum (cep-
strum) is the base of this feature. The difference between cepstrum and mel-
frequency cepstrum is that MFC is equally spaced on the mel scale, which
approximates the human auditory systems` response in a more accurate way.
In other words, Mel-frequency is proportional to the logarithm of the linear
frequency that has the same effect on the humans' aural perception[15]. This
feature has shown more efficiency [8] in comparison with other speech recog-
nition features.
Hence, we decided to use MFCC features for our experiments. Normally,
in this feature the first 13 coefficients are considered as the important ones
and the rest are not influential in the final results. So, we took account of the
first 13 MFCC coefficients for each frame we selected for feature extraction
in our data.
5.3.2 Feature Extraction Procedure
Asonov et al. [1] discussed that peaks are not sufficient for recognition. They
used 40ms (or four 10ms frames) after the press peak to create the feature
array. We could not follow this approach because the average duration of an
Enigma keystroke is greater than that of ordinary keyboards. So we used
four peaks in each sample, rather than two. We considered a number of
different scenarios in our experiments in order to find the best combination
of frames. The combination that showed the most promising results includes
2 frames before pre-Press Peak, Pre-Press Peak frame, 3 frames after pre-
Press Peak, 3 frames before Press Peak, Press Peak frame, 7 Press after Press
peak, 2 frames before pre-Release Peak, Pre-Release Peak frame, 3 frames
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after pre-Release Peak, 10 frames before Release Peak, Release Peak frame
and 3 frames after Release Peak.
5.4 Recognition
The selection of a proper classifier is vital. We have implemented a variety
of classifiers in our experiments. The input of each classifier is a set of
features extracted in the previous step. Firstly, we randomly chose 60% of
the samples for training the classifiers. Then, the remaining samples are
used for recognition.
In our experiments, statistical classifiers showed better performance. In
this category, each row is assigned to a class based on the membership like-
lihood.
Among the different statistical classification methods we assessed, the
discriminative analysis classifier was the most efficient. The Discriminative
analysis classifier assumes the input data has a normal multi-variant distri-
bution and all classes share the same covariance[20].
The Naive Bayes classifier is another well-known statistical classification
algorithm which is based on Bayes theory in probability. Similar to Discrim-
inant Analysis Classification, this method assigns a membership degree to
all classes for each input. Accordingly, the input belongs to the class with
the maximum membership degree.
We have applied Artificial Neural Networks(ANN) classifier as well. Our
ANN classifier has 2 hidden layers of 100 nodes, with Scaled conjugate gra-
dient back propagation for training.
Furthermore, we wanted to assess the possibility of recognizing rotor
movement. In our data collection, we asked the participants to type L
twice. We consider these recordings of L as two classes. The first class
contains the samples in which one rotor moved. The second is of L samples
including the two rotor movements. We have trained some classifiers based
on these two classes. We decided to assess SVM classifier in addition to
other ones because it is widely accepted as an efficient classifier for binary
classification [6]. We have applied the same strategy for training and testing
the classifier.
6 Results
In this section, we discuss our experimental results. The data analysis was
done using Matlab. We implemented the algorithms using an Intel CoreTM
i7-2600S CPU @ 2.80 GHz with 8.00 GB of memory. The Operating Sys-
tem was Windows 7 Enterprise, 64 bit and we used Matlab V. R2012a
(7.14.0.739), 64 bit.
We divided our experiments into two categories: firstly, the recognition
of keys based on their recording samples and secondly the recognition of
15
Table 1: Key Recognition results for three classifiers. Success Rate means
the percentage of correct recognition
Classifier Success Rate
Artificial Neural Networks 67.14%
Naive Bayes 75.72%
Discriminant Analysis 84.31%
rotor movement in recordings. We will discuss these two categories in the
following sections.
6.1 Keyboard Recognition
Our recognition algorithm was based on the procedure described in Figure 5.
The input is an array of MFCC coefficients and the output is one of the 26
letters on the Enigma keyboard. We trained the classifier with the train-
ing set of recordings. For each recording in the test set, we attempted to
recognize the corresponding English alphabetic characters. Obviously, suc-
cessful recognition happens when our classifier recognizes the typed letter
correctly. It is worthwhile to note that the chance of getting the correct
letter by random guess is 126 = 3.84%.
We have implemented various classifiers, including Artificial Neural Net-
work Classifier, Linear Discriminative Analysis, Naive Bayes with Gaussian
distribution, Naive Bayes with Kernel Distribution, K-Nearest Neighbour,
Decision Tree, Ensemble Discriminant, Ensemble KNN, Ensemble Decision
Tree. Table 1 summarizes the best results from the top three classifiers.
As shown in Table 1, Discriminant Analysis gave the best recognition
rate in our experiments, i.e., 84.31%. This is significantly higher than the
rate of 1/26 (3.8%) that would be achieved by random guessing.
The analysis of the classifiers` confusion matrix showed in most of the
wrong recognitions, the key is miss-recognized as one of the neighbouring
keys. Therefore, the results could still improve by using linguistic methods
such as Hidden Markov Models and considering the adjacent keys as the
potential correct recognized key.
6.2 Rotor Movement Recognition
Because of the time that would have been involved, and the error-prone
nature of the rotor re-positioning that would have been required, we inves-
tigated the effect of double rotor movements on just a single key, rather
than for all twenty-six letters of the alphabet. Specifically, we recorded two
samples of the L key in each data collection, the second of which involved
movement of the second as well as the first rotor. In the classifiers for this
section, the input was an array of MFCC coefficients and the output indi-
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Table 2: Rotor Recognition results for three classifiers. Success Rate means
the percentage of correct recognition
Classifier Success Rate
Artificial Neural Networks 92.18%
SVM 89.06%
Discriminant Analysis 84.31%
cated whether there had been one or two rotor movements. We used three
classifiers to recognize the output. Obviously, successful recognition means
identifying the correct number of rotor movements. The results for this
recognition are summarized in table 2.
In another experiment, we investigated how the recognition rate changes
when we insert the records of L with two rotor movements among the
records (all involving just single rotor movements) from the rest of the key-
board letters. We have set different labels for the one and two rotor move-
ments of L. In our experiments, the recognition rate reduced by 1% in
comparison with the results in section 6.1. Our observations of the confu-
sion matrix showed in nearly half of the wrong recognitions, L with two
rotor movements is mistaken for L with a single movement. Therefore, the
correct letter has been recognized anyway. In addition, we investigated the
recognition of the key L regardless of the number of rotor movements. In
order to do so, we used the same label for all L records, without considering
the number of the rotors involved. Our recognition results were the same as
the previous set of experiments in section 6.1. Thus our experiments showed
that rotor movement does not significantly impact on letter recognition, and
that we can distinguish the number of rotor movements involved.
7 Conclusions
We have performed an acoustic side channel attack on an original World
War II three-rotor Enigma machine. In our experiments we have identified
four peaks in each sound sample and used an LPC based approach in this
preprocessing. We extracted MFCC (Mel-frequency cepstrum coefficients), a
common frequency based feature in speech recognition, from the samples in
the feature extraction phase. We used 60% of the samples to train a classifier
and implemented various classifiers in order to compare their performance.
We found that statistical classifiers were the most efficient. Among them,
the Discriminant analysis classifier gives the best recognition rate of 84.31%.
Our experiments showed that the variability across the typists such as age,
body type, gender and experience did not significantly affect the achievable
recognition rate. Additionally, we performed an experiment to detect double
rotor movements. We had two classes of recordings that used the same
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key. The first class is of samples in which only a single rotor moved and in
the other class, two rotors moved. We applied the same preprocessing and
feature extraction algorithms on the samples. In this experiment, 60% of
the samples were used for training. An Artificial Neural Network classifier
proved to have the highest recognition rate of 92.18%. To sum up, by utilizing
state-of-the-art computing techniques, we were able to reliably decode the
secret message typed by an Enigma machine by just analysing the sounds
made. The improvement of the recognition rate from 1/26 (3.8%) to 84.31%,
can be regarded as further evidence of the great advances in computing
technology after World War II, and of how acoustic side channel attacks are
now providing a powerful cryptanalysis tool.
Availability
All the Enigma recordings used are publicly available at http://homepages.
cs.ncl.ac.uk/ehsan.toreini/enigma/. This is to facilitate others to im-
prove the classifier algorithms against the benchmark performance reported
in this paper.
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